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253, 263 [86 P. 187]; People v. Costello, 21 Ca1.2d 760 [135
P.2d 164]; see People v. Ryan, 152 Cal. ;'164 [92 P. 853].)
There can be no justifiable reliance on decisions allowing this
instruction in view of the repeated warnings by this court
that district attorneys should not offer and trial courts should
not give it. A decision that cannot properly be relied upon
cannot serve to justify adherence to an interpretation it condemns. Nothing is gained and much is lost by insisting upon
a mechanical adherence to precedent that perpetuates an admittedly erroneous interpretation of a statute and defeats
the very purpose of the Legislature in enacting it.

APPEALS from orders of the Superior Court of Alameda
County refusing to set aside appointment of an administratrix. Leon E. Gray, Judge. Affirmed.
J. C. Gibson, Leo E. Sievert, H. K. Lockwood and L. W.
Butterfield for Appellant.
Hildebrand, Bills & McLeod and Louis H.Brownstone for
Respondent.

Schauer, J., concurred.

[So F. No. 16906.

wherever the debtor is subject to suit, a cause of action for
wrongful death under the Federal Employers' Liability Act
has a situs, for purposes of administration, in any county
where the defendant does business.

In Bank. Feb. 10, 1944.]

Estate of FREDERICK ALBERT W AIT~, Deceased. THE
ATCHISON, TOPEKA AND SANTA FE RAILWAY
COMPANY (a Corporation), Appellant, V. CHARLOTTE E. LEET, as Administratrix, etc., Respondent.
[8. F. No. 16907. In Bank. Feb. 10, 1944.]
Estate of IVAN R. MILLER, Deceased. THE ATCHISON,
TOPEKA AND SANTA FE RAILWAY COMPANY (a
Corporation), Appellant, V. CHARLOTTE E. LEET, as
Administratrix, etc., Respondent.
[1] Decedents' Estates - Jurisdiction - Existence of Property-

Cause of Action for Death.-A cause of action for wrongful
death under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (45 U.S.
C.A., § 51 et seq.) is "estate" within Prob. Code, § 301; authorizing the probate court to appoint an administrator,
even though the decedent was not a resident of the state and
there are no other assets.
[2] Id. - Jurisdiction - Situs of Property - Choses in Action.Under the rule that a debt will be regarded as an asset
[1] Cause of action for death as justifying appointment of
administrator, note, 59 A.L.R. 92.8ee, also, 21 Am.Jur. 396.
[2] See 11A Cal.Jur. 114; 21 Am.Jur. 401.
McK. Dig. Reference: [1, 2] Decedents' Estates, § 4L

TRAYNOR, J.-Petitioner, The Atchison, Topeka and
Santa Fe Railway Company, appeals from two orders denying motions to set aside the appointment of Charlotte E.
Leet as administratrix of the estate of Ivan R. Miller and
of the estate of Frederick Albert Wa.its. These appeals have
been consolidated because they involve substantially the same
facts and the same legal question. The petitions· f'or letters
of administration were filed in the Superior Oourtof A.lameda County on August 15, 1942. The· petition in the Miller
estate alleged that Ivan R. Miller was a resident of Albuquerque, New Mexico, where he died, and tha.t "it is necessary that an Administratrix be appointed in order to prosecute a claim for damages against said Atchison, Topeka and
Santa Fe Railroad Co., for the death of' said deceased, under
the provisions of' the Federal Employers' Liability Act (45
U.S.C.A., sec. 51 et seq.) ; that under the provisions of'said
act, such suit, although prosecuted in the name of' the Administratrix, is f'or the benefit of the mother of said decedent,
and that any recovery in such action belongs to the mother
of said decedent as his heir at law, and is not a part of the
estate of said decedent.... " The petition also alleged that
the foregoing claim is the sole estate of said decedent. The
allegations of the petition in Estate of Waits were identical,
except that there it appeared that Frederick Albert Waits,
who died in Albuquerque, New Mexico, was a resident of
Navajo County, Arizona, and that any recovery under the
liability act would be for the benefit of his wife and minor
son. On September 18, 1942, these petitions were ·granted,
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and letters of administration were issued to Charlotte Leet.
On October 3, 1942, in the Contra Costa County Superior
Court, Oharlotte Leet, as administratrix of the estate of
Ivan R. Miller, brought suit against petitioner for negligently causing the death of Miller. On the same date she
brought a similar action against petitioner for causing the
death of Waits. On October 15, 1942, petitioner moved to
set aside the appointment of respondent as administratrix.
On January 4, 1943, both motions were denied.
[1] Petitioner contends that the probate court lacked
jurisdiction to appoint respondent as administratrix. This
cOlltention must be sustained unless the cause of action for
wrongful death can be regarded as "estate" within Alamed~
County, for the Probate Code authorizes administration only
in the county in which the decedent was a resident, or where
he left estate. (Prob. Code, sec. 301.)
It is generally recognized that the courts of a state
other than that in which the decedent was domiciled cannot
appoint an administrator if there are no assets within the
jurisdiction. (See 21 Am.Jur. 395; Restatement,Conflict of
Laws, sec. 467.) It is also generally recognized that a
cause of action for wrongful death, which is enforceable
within the jurisdiction, and which the personal representativeis charged with enforcing, is such an asset. (State v.
Probate Court, 149 Minn. 464 [184 N.W. 43] ; Lancaster &Wallace v. Sexton (Tex.Civ.App.), 245 S.W. 958; Southern
Pac. Co. v. De Valle Da Costa, 190 F. 689 [111 C.C.A. 417] ;
Jordan v. Chicago &- Northwestern Ry. Co., 125 Wis. 581
[104 N.W. 803, 110 Am.St.Rep. 865, 4 Ann.Cas. 1113, 1
L.R.A.N.S. 885] ; McCarron v. New York Cent. R. Co., 239
Mass. 64 [131 N.E. 478] ; Lttnd v. City of Seattle, 163 Wash.
254 [1 P.2d 301]; Berry v. Rutland Railroad Co., 103 Vt.
388 [154 A. 671]; In re Mayo, 60 S.C. 401 [38 S.E. 634,
54 L.R.A. 660] ; Howard v. Nashville C. &- St. L. Ry. Co., 133
Tenn. 19 [179 S.W. 380]; see 3 Beale, Conflict of Laws
[1935], p. 1457 et seq.; 21 Am.Jur. 396; 59 A.L.R. 92; Restatement, Conflict of Laws, sec. 467.) It has thus frequently
been held that an administrator may be appointed to enforce
a cause of action for death under the Federal Employers'
Liability Act even though there are no other assets in the
jurisdiction. (State v. Probate Court, supra; Lancaster &Wallace v. Sexton, supra; McCarron v. New York Oent. R.
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Co., supra; Howard v. NashvilleO. &- St. L. Ry. 00., supra ..>
The Federal Employers' Liability Act authorizes SUlt
by the aggrieved party in any' state where ~he carrier does
business. (45 U.S.C.A., sec. 59; Miles v. Illmots Central R.
Co., 315 U.S. 698 [62 S.Ct. 827, 86 L.Ed 1129].) Since. a
snit requires the appointment of a personal representatIve
(A.merican R. R. Co. v. Birch, 224 U.S. 547 [32 S.Ct: 603,
56 L.Ed. 879]), who is ordinarily allowed to sue only In the
state of his appoint.ment (see Code Civ. Proc., sec. 1913). refusal to appoint an administrator in a state where snit is
authorized by the act would uullify the \'ery ri~ht the act
grants. (See Howard v. Nashville C. &- St. L. Ry. Co. suo
pra.) An estate mnst exist before an administrator can
be appointed, for if there wC're no estate there would be no
function for the administrator to p~rform. (See Restatement, Conflict of Laws, comment to sec. 467.) Enforcement
of a cause of action for wrongful death under the Federal
Employers' Liability Act is a function that can be performed
only by the administrator, and snch a cause of action should
therefore be regarded as an estate justifying his appointmept.
Petitioner relies on lang-uage in Michigan Central Railway
Co. v. Vrecland, 227 U.S. 59, 68 [33 S.Ot. 192, 57 L.Ed.
417], to the effect that the cause of action provided by the
act is independent of any other that the deceased might ha....e.
This reasoning applies to any cause of action conseqnent to
the death of the decedent, such as a cause of action for the
payment of life insurance on a policy executed for the benefit of the estate. If a cause of action matures concurrently
with the decedent's death, it does not follow that no administrator should be appointed to enforce it. Petitioner relies
also on language in Lindgren v. United States, 281 U.S 38,
41 [50 S.Ot. 207, 74 L.Ed. 686], to the effect that the cause
of action under the act is not part of the estate of the deceased and on similar statements in Ruiz v. Santa Barbara
Gas etc. 00., 164 Cal. 188 [128 P. 330] ; Estate of Riccorni,
185 Cal. 458 [197 P. 97, 14 A.L.R. 509], and Costa v. Superior Court, 137 Cal. 79 [69 P. 840], concerning the California wrongful death statute. In the Lindgren case, however,
the court held merely that no suit could be brought under
the act unless one of the designated beneficiaries survived.
In Ruiz v. Santa Barbara it was held only that a special administrator could commence and maintain an action under
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the California statute, and that the general administrator
could subsequently be substituted as plaintiff. In making the
statement on which petitioner relies, the court was concerned
only with the fact that the cause of action for wrongful death
is for the benefit of persons who may not necessarily share
in the remainder of the estate. The other California cases
cited were likewise concerned with the fact that the cause
of action for wrongful death is for such statutory beneficiaries
and that the recovery is divided according to principles
other than those ordinarily governing decedents' estates. In
these respects the cause of action for wrongful death differs
from most of the assets constituting the estate, but it resembles I1l1ch assets in being held by the administrator and enforced by him on behalf of the beneficiaries. This resemblance is significant. Any assets controlled by the administrator should be regarded as an estate within the meaning of the code section authorizing the appointment of the
administrator.
[2] Petitioner contends tbat the situs of a debt is properly
the domicile of the creditor, and that even if this cause of
action is regarded as an estate it does not have its situs in
Alameda County. The cause of action for wrongful death,
however, is vested exclusively in the personal representative
of the deceased (American R. 00. v. Birch, supra), and the
logical result of this contention would be that this cause of
action had no situs until an administrator was appointed. An
intangible, unlike real or tangible per80nal property, has no
physical characteristics that would serve as a basis for assigning it to a particular locality. The location assigned to it
depends on what action is to be taken with reference to it.
It has therefore been widely held that a debt has its situs at
the domicile of the debtor for purposes of administration,
since it may be necessary to sue him there and to have an
administrator appointed to bring suit. (See 3 Beale, Conflict
of Laws [1935], p. 1452; see 23 Minn. L. Rev. 221.) By the
same reasoning a debt will be regarded as an asset wherever
the debtor is subject to suit. (New England Mutual Life Ins.
00. v. Woodworth, 111 U.S. 138 [4 S.Ct. 364, 28 L.Ed. 379] ;
Equitable Life Assurance Soc. v. Vogel's Executrix, 76 Ala.
441 [52 Am.Rep. 344] j see 23 Minn. L. Rev. 221.) The Federal Employers' Liability Act makes defendant subject to
suit on this cause of action wherever defendant does business.
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Sinee defendant does business in Alameda County the cause
of action has a situs in Alameda County for purposes of
administration.
The orders are affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Curtis,
J., and Schauer, J., concurred.

(S. F. No. 16950.

In Bank.
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Edmonds, J., Carter,

Feb. 10, 1944.J

O. D. ADAJ\iS, Appellant, v. AMERICAN PRESIDENT
LINES, LTD. (a Corporation), Respondent.
[1] Appeal-Presumptions-Orders on Motion for New Trial.-Where an order granting a new trial did not .specify iDflUfficiency of the evidence to support the verdict, that ground
cannot be considered on appeal unless the evidence is without
conflict and insufficient as matter of law.
[2] Seamen-Injuries to Seamen-Jones Act.-Recovery of damages by an employee under the Jones Act (46U.S.C.A., §'688)
is predicated on negligence of the employer•.
[3] Master and Servant-Federal Employers' Liability Act-Negligence of Fellow Servant as Defense.-TheFederIlLEmployers' Liability Act (45 U.S.C.A., §51et seq.) abrogates the
common-law rule that an employee must bear the risk 'of injury or death through the fault or:negligence of a fellow
servant, ,and applies the principle, of respondeat superior to
impose liability on the employer.
".
[4] Seamen-Injuries to Seamen-Liability ofMaster.~The master is not liable for injury to a seaman arising from the ,negligence of a servant acting beyond the scope of his employment.
[5] Master and Servant - Injuries to Employees - Questions of
i:..aw.-The question of what acts are within the scope of employment is one of law.
[2] See 10 Oal.Jur. Ten-year Supp. 275; 48 Am.Jur. 123.
[3] See 16 Oal.Jur. 1093; 35 Am.Jur. 760.
McK. Dig.. References: [1] Appeal and Error, § 1209a; [2,.4, 9,
10] Seamen, § 2; [3] Master and Servllnt, § 203; [5] Master and
Servant, § 170; [6, 7] Seamen, § 1; [8J Master and Servant, § 62;
Seamen, §1; [l1J Trial, § 195.

